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REFINED APPROACHABILITY ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATION TO
REGRET MINIMIZATION WITH GLOBAL COSTS
JOON KWON
Abstract. Blackwell’s approachability is a framework where two players, the Decision Maker and
the Environment, play a repeated game with vector-valued payoffs. The goal of the Decision Maker
is to make the average payoff converge to a given set called the target. When this is indeed possible,
simple algorithms which guarantee the convergence are known. This abstract tool was successfully
used for the construction of optimal strategies in various repeated games, but also found several
applications in online learning. By extending an approach proposed by [ABH11], we construct and
analyze a class of Follow the Regularized Leader algorithms (FTRL) for Blackwell’s approachability
which are able to minimize not only the Euclidean distance to the target set (as it is often the case
in the context of Blackwell’s approachability) but a wide range of distance-like quantities. This
flexibility enables us to apply these algorithms to minimize the exact quantity of interest in various
online learning problems. In particular, for regret minimization with global costs, we obtain novel
guarantees for general norm cost functions, and for the case of ℓp cost functions, we obtain the first
regret bounds with explicit dependence in p and the dimension d.
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1. Introduction
One of the foundational results of game theory is von Neumann’s minimax theorem which char-
acterizes the highest payoff that each player of a finite zero-sum game can guarantee regardless of
the opponent’s strategy. In the seminal works [Bla56, Bla54], a surprising extension of this result
was proposed in the context of repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. The so-called Blackwell’s
condition characterizes the convex sets that the player can guarantee to asymptotically reach, re-
gardless of the opponent’s actions. In the case of non-convex sets, this condition remains sufficient.
Moreover, the so-called Blackwell’s algorithm guarantees, when the above condition is satisfied for
a given set called the target, that the average vector-valued payoff converges to (approaches) the
target set at rate O(1/
√
T ). This topic is now called Blackwell’s approachability.
Date: September 9, 2020.
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This framework was used for the construction of optimal strategies in repeated games as
in [Koh75], see also the survey work [Per14] and references therein. Beyond the field of game
theory, this tool has been noticed by the machine learning community and used for constructing
and analyzing algorithm for various online decision problems such as regret minimization [CBL06],
asymptotic calibration [Daw82, FV98], regret minimization with variable stage duration [MS08] or
with global cost functions [EDKMM09]. However, one of the drawbacks of using Blackwell’s ap-
proachability is that algorithms then usually minimize the Euclidean distance of the average payoffs
to the target set, which is seldom the exact quantity of interest in online learning applications. One
of the main objectives of the present work is to provide a flexible class of algorithms which are able
to minimize various distance-like quantities, and not only the Euclidean distance.
Several alternative approachability algorithms were also proposed, including potential-based al-
gorithm [HMC01] which generalize the Euclidean projection involved in Blackwell’s algorithm, and
response-based algorithms [BS15] which avoid the projection altogether. Besides, an important
scheme used in several works is the conversion of regret minimization algorithms into approachabil-
ity algorithms [ABH11, Shi16, MPS14].
Regret minimization was introduced by Hannan [Han57] and is a sequential decision problem
where the Decision Maker aims at minimizing the difference between its payoff and the highest
payoff in hindsight given by a constant strategy. The link between approachability and regret
minimization was already noticed by [Bla54] who reduced regret minimization to an approachability
problem. [HMC01] proposed an alternative reduction and constructed a whole family of regret
minimization algorithm based on potential-based approachability algorithms. Conversely, regret
minimizing algorithms have been converted into approachability algorithms [Per15, ABH11, Shi16].
1.1. Related work. In [Per15], the Exponential Weights Algorithm, which is a central regret
minimization algorithm, is adapted to approachability, and the resulting algorithm minimizes the
ℓ∞ distance to the target set.
The conversion scheme presented in [ABH11] deals with online linear optimization algorithms
which are transposed into the approachability of convex cone target sets, and the associated guar-
antee is an upper bound on the Euclidean distance to the target set. An extension to all convex
target sets is also given, which involves the adding of a dimension.
A closely related work is [Shi16] where a conversion from online convex optimization algorithm
to approachability of bounded convex sets is presented, with guarantees an upper bound on the
distance to the target set measured with the Euclidean norm or possibly any other norm.
One of the applications of approachability is the problem of regret minimization with global costs,
introduced in [EDKMM09] and already analyzed as an approachability problem. This problem was
further studied in [RST11, BS15], and in a recent paper [LHT20], the authors used the conversion
scheme from [Shi16] to construct and analyze algorithms for this problem.
1.2. Contributions.
• We consider a class of Follow the Regularized Leader algorithms (FTRL) which we convert
from regret minimization to approachability. The conversion scheme we use is a refinement
of [ABH11], and the algorithms thus obtained are capable of minimizing not only the Eu-
clidean distance to the target set as in [ABH11], but the distance measured by an arbitrary
norm, or even more general distance-like quantities. This flexibility will prove itself useful
in the construction of tailored algorithms with tight bounds for various problems, which we
now mention.
• For the problem of regret minimization with a global cost function, we construct algorithms
for arbitrary norm cost functions and obtain novel guarantees. In particular, for ℓp norm
cost functions (1 6 p 6 +∞), we obtain the first explicit regret bounds that depend on p
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and the dimension d, and which smoothly interpolate from O(
√
(log d)/T ) for p = ∞ to
O(d/
√
T ) for p = 1.
• For the problems of internal regret/swap regret minimization and online combinatorial op-
timization, we demonstrate that our approachability algorithms are capable of minimizing
the exact quantities of interest and recovering the optimal guaranties, thus illustrating the
flexibility and generality of our class of algorithms. The reduction of online combinatorial
optimization to approachability that we present is novel.
• We prove that Blackwell’s original algorithm is a special case of our class of algorithms.
1.3. Summary. In Section 2, we present a model of approachability with target sets which are
closed convex cones. In Section 3, we define a class of FTRL algorithms and derive a general
guarantee. In Section 4, we recall Blackwell’s algorithm and prove that it belongs to the class of
algorithms defined in Section 3. In Section 5, we present a variant of the model from Section 2, where
the Decision Maker may choose its actions at random from a finite set. We then define corresponding
FTRL algorithms and provide guarantees in expectation, with high probability and almost-surely.
In Section 6, we recall the problem of regret minimization with global cost functions. We construct
a FTRL algorithm for arbitrary norm cost functions and derive a general regret bound. In the
special case of ℓp norm cost functions, we derive explicit regret bounds. In Sections 7 and 8, we
recall the problems of online combinatorial optimization and internal/swap regret respectively, their
reductions to approachability problems, and demonstrate that a carefully chosen FTRL algorithm
recover the optimal regret bounds.
1.4. Notation. d > 1 will always denote an integer. All vector spaces will be of finite dimension.
For p ∈ [1,+∞], we denote ‖ · ‖p the ℓp norms, meaning for x ∈ Rd, ‖x‖p =
(∑d
i=1 |xi|p
)1/p
for
p < +∞ and ‖x‖∞ = max |xi|. For a given norm ‖ · ‖ in a vector space, the dual norm ‖ · ‖∗ is defined
by ‖y‖∗ = sup‖x‖61 |〈y|x〉|. Denote ∆d the unit simplex of Rd: ∆d =
{
x ∈ Rd+
∣∣∣∑di=1 xi = 1}. For
a sequence (rt)t>1 of vectors, we denote rT =
1
T
∑T
t=1 rt the average of the T first terms (T > 1).
If X a subset of a vector space, IX denotes the convex indicator of X , in other words: IX (x) = 0 if
x ∈ X and IX (x) = +∞ otherwise. If a vector xt ∈ Rd is denoted with an index (t in this example),
its components are denoted with an additional index as follows: xt = (xti)16i6d.
2. Approachability of convex cones
We introduce a simple repeated game with vector-valued payoffs between two players (the Decision
Maker and the Environment) with a closed convex cone target set for the Decision Maker. We then
present a few properties about closed convex cones and support functions.
2.1. Model. Let V be a finite-dimensional vector space and denote V∗ its dual. The latter will
be the payoff space. Let A and B be the action sets for the Decision Maker and the Environment
respectively, about which we assume no special structure. Let r:A × B → V∗ be a vector-valued
payoff function. The game is played as follows. At time t > 1,
• the Decision Maker chooses action at ∈ A;
• the Environment chooses action bt ∈ B;
• the Decision Maker observes vector payoff rt := r(at, bt) ∈ V∗.
Formally, an algorithm (or strategy) σ for the Decision Maker is a sequence of maps σ = (σt)t>1
where σt : (A×V∗)t−1 → A so that for a given algorithm σ and a given sequence of actions (bt)t>1
chosen by the Environment, action at is given by
at = σt(a1, r1, . . . , at−1, rt−1), t > 1.
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Figure 1. The polar cone of a set A and the bipolar
We allow the Environment to be adversarial. In other words, action bt chosen by the Environment
may depend on anything that has happened before it is chosen, including at, and we may even
assume that the Environment is aware of the algorithm used by the Decision Maker.
The problem involves a target set C ⊂ V∗ which we assume to be a closed convex cone (for the
case where target set is a closed convex set but not a cone, we refer to [ABH11] where a conversion
scheme into an auxiliary problem where the target is a cone is presented). Definitions and properties
about closed convex cones are gathered in Section 2.2 and Appendix A. The goal is to construct
algorithms which guarantee that the average payoff rT :=
1
T
∑T
t=1 rt is close to the target C in a
sense that will be made precise.
The above model does not allow the Decision Maker to choose actions at random. Such a model
will be presented in Section 5.
2.2. Closed convex convex. We recall the definitions of a closed convex cone, of the polar cone,
and gather a few properties. Throughout the paragraph, W will be a finite-dimensional vector space
and W∗ its dual.
Definition 2.1. A nonempty subset C of W is a closed convex cone if it is closed and if for all
y, y′ ∈ C and λ ∈ R+, we have y + y′ ∈ C and λy ∈ C.
Definition 2.2. Let A be a subset of W. The polar cone of A is a subset of the dual space W∗
defined by
A◦ = {x ∈ W∗ | ∀y ∈ A, 〈y|x〉 6 0} .
We now introduce a key notion of this work which will be used in Section 2.3 to define the class
of quantities that will be minimized by the algorithms defined in Section 3.2.
Definition 2.3. Let C be a closed convex cone. A set X is a generator of C if it is convex, compact
and if R+X = C.
The following proposition gives three examples of generators. The second example demonstrates
that a generator always exists.
Proposition 2.4. (i) If W = W∗ = Rd, the negative orthant Rd− is a closed convex cone and
(Rd−)
◦ = Rd+. Moreover, ∆d is a generator of R
d
+.
(ii) Let C ⊂ W be a closed convex cone, ‖ · ‖ a norm on W, and B the closed unit ball with respect
to ‖ · ‖. Then, B ∩ C is a generator of C.
(iii) If X is a nonempty convex compact subset of W, then X is a generator of X ◦◦ = R+X .
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Figure 2. C ∩ B is a generator of C
Proof. (i) is easy. (ii) holds because B ∩ C is indeed nonempty, convex as the intersection of two
convex sets, and for any point x ∈ C \ {0}, x/‖x‖ belongs to B ∩ C, so that R+(B ∩ C) = C. (iii) is
a consequence of Proposition A.1. 
2.3. Support functions. We now present support functions which will be used in Section 3.2 to
express the quantities that will be minimized by our algorithms.
Definition 2.5. For a nonempty subset X ⊂ V, the application I∗X : V∗ → R ∪ {+∞} defined by
I∗X (y) = sup
x∈X
〈y|x〉 , y ∈ V∗,
is called the support function of X .
The support function can be written as the Legendre–Fenchel transform of the indicator function
of X . It is therefore convex. Moreover, in the case where X is a generator of the polar cone C◦
of some closed convex cone C ⊂ V∗, the properties of I∗X make it suitable for measuring how far a
point of V∗ is from C. Indeed, it is easy to check that I∗X is then real-valued, continuous, and that
for all points y ∈ V∗,
I∗X (y) 6 0 ⇐⇒ y ∈ C.
The following proposition demonstrates that the distance to a closed convex cone C with respect
to an arbitrary norm can be written as a support function. It is an is an extension of Lemma 13
in [ABH11] to an arbitrary norm.
Proposition 2.6. Let C be a closed convex cone in V∗, ‖ · ‖ a norm on V and ‖ · ‖∗ its dual norm
on V∗. Then,
inf
y′∈C
∥∥y′ − y∥∥
∗
= I∗B∩C◦(y), y ∈ V∗,
where B is the closed unit ball for ‖ · ‖.
Proof. Let y ∈ V∗. Using the definition of the dual norm and Sion’s minimax theorem,
inf
y′∈C
∥∥y′ − y∥∥
∗
= inf
y′∈C
sup
x∈B
〈
y − y′
∣∣x〉 = sup
x∈B
inf
y′∈C
{〈y|x〉 − 〈y′∣∣x〉} .
Suppose x does not belong to C◦. Then, there exists y′0 ∈ C such that 〈y′0|x〉 > 0. C being closed by
multiplication by R+, the quantity 〈y′|x〉 (with y′ ∈ C) can be made arbitrarily large, and thus the
above infimum is equal to −∞. Therefore, we can restrict the above supremum to B ∩ C◦. We thus
have
inf
y′∈C
∥∥y′ − y∥∥
∗
= sup
x∈B∩C◦
{
〈y|x〉 − sup
y′∈C
〈
y′
∣∣x〉
}
.
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The above embedded supremum is zero because for x ∈ B ∩ C◦ and y′ ∈ C we obviously have
〈y′|x〉 6 0, and 0 is attained with y′ = 0. Finally,
inf
y′∈C
∥∥y′ − y∥∥
∗
= sup
x∈B∩C◦
〈y|x〉 = I∗B∩C◦(y).

2.4. Blackwell’s condition. In the case of convex sets, Blackwell’s condition [Bla56] is a charac-
terization of the target sets to which the Decision Maker can guarantee a convergence. We here
present the special case of convex cones, which will be used in the construction and the analysis of
the algorithms in Section 3.2.
Definition 2.7 (Blackwell’s condition for convex cones). A closed convex cone C of the payoff space
V∗ is a B-set for the game (A,B, r) if
∀x ∈ C◦, ∃ a(x) ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B, 〈r(a(x), b)|x〉 6 0.
Such an application a : C◦ → A is called a (A,B, r, C)-oracle.
In some situations, it is easier to establish the following equivalent dual condition.
Proposition 2.8 (Blackwell’s dual condition). A closed convex cone C of the payoff space V∗ is a
B-set for the game (A,B, r) if, and only if
∀b ∈ B, ∃a ∈ A, r(a, b) ∈ C.
3. A class of FTRL algorithms
We define a class of Follow the Regularized Leader algorithms (FTRL) which are transposed from
regret minimization, and which guarantee, when the target set is indeed a B-set, that the average
payoff converges to the target set, the convergence being measured in a sense that will be made
precise.
3.1. Regularizers. We first introduce a few tools from convex analysis needed for the definition
and the analysis of FTRL algorithms [SS07, SS11, Bub11], which are also known as dual averag-
ing [Nes09] in the context of optimization. These are classic and the proofs are given in Appen-
dix B for the sake of completeness. Again, V and V∗ are finite-dimensional vectors spaces and X
is a nonempty convex compact subset of V. We define regularizers, present the notion of strong
convexity with respect to an arbitrary norm, and give two important examples of regularizers along
with their properties. We recall that the domain domh of a function h : V → R ∪ {+∞} is the set
of points where it has finite values.
Definition 3.1. A convex function h : V → R∪ {+∞} is a regularizer on X if it is strictly convex,
lower semicontinuous, and has X as domain.
Proposition 3.2. Let h be a regularizer on X . Its Legendre–Fenchel transform h∗ : V∗ → R∪{+∞},
defined by
h∗(y) = sup
x∈V
{〈y|x〉 − h(x)} , y ∈ V∗,
satisfies the following properties.
(i) domh∗ = V∗;
(ii) h∗ is differentiable on V∗;
(iii) For all y ∈ V∗, ∇h∗(y) = argmaxx∈X {〈y|w〉 − h(x)}. In particular, ∇h∗ takes values in X .
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Definition 3.3. Let h : V → R∪{+∞} be a function, ‖ · ‖ a norm on V, and K > 0. h is K-strongly
convex with respect to ‖ · ‖ if for all x, x′ ∈ V and λ ∈ [0, 1],
(1) h(λx+ (1− λ)x′) 6 λh(x) + (1− λ)h(x′)− Kλ(1− λ)
2
∥∥x′ − x∥∥2 .
We now give two classical examples of regularizers which will be used in Sections 4, 6, 7 and 8.
Recall that ∆d denotes the unit simplex of R
d: ∆d =
{
x ∈ Rd+
∣∣∣∑di=1 xi = 1}.
Definition 3.4 (Entropic regularizer). The entropic regularizer hent : R
d → R ∪ {+∞} is defined
as
hent(x) =
{∑d
i=1 xi log xi if x ∈ ∆d
+∞ otherwise,
where xi log xi = 0 when xi = 0.
Proposition 3.5. (i) hent is a regularizer on ∆d;
(ii) ∇h∗ent(y) =
(
exp yi∑d
j=1 exp yj
)
16j6d
, for all y ∈ Rd;
(iii) maxx∈∆d hent(x)−minx∈∆d hent(x) = log d;
(iv) hent is 1-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖1.
Definition 3.6 (ℓp regularizer). For p ∈ (1, 2] and a nonempty convex compact subset X of Rd,
the associated ℓp regularizer is defined as
hp(x) =
{
1
2 ‖x‖2p if x ∈ X
+∞ otherwise.
Proposition 3.7. Let p ∈ (1, 2].
(i) hp is a regularizer on X ;
(ii) hp is (p − 1)d2(1/p−1)-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖1;
(iii) ∇h∗2(y) = projX (y) for all y ∈ Rd where projX denotes the Euclidean projection onto X .
3.2. Definition and analysis of the algorithm. We now construct the FTRL algorithms for the
model introduced in Section 2.1 and derive guarantees.
Let C be a B-set for the game (A,B, r) and a : C◦ → A a (A,B, r, C) -oracle. Let X ⊂ V
be a generator of C◦, h a regularizer on X , and (ηt)t>1 a positive and nonincreasing sequence of
parameters. The associated algorithm is then defined for t > 1 as:
compute xt = ∇h∗
(
ηt−1
t−1∑
s=1
rs
)
compute at = a (xt)
observe rt = r(at, bt).
The above definition of xt can be interpreted as the action played by a FTRL algorithm in an
online linear optimization problem with action set X and payoff vectors (rt)t>1. We state in the
following lemma the classical regret bound guaranteed by such an algorithm [SS07, SS11, Bub11].
The proof is given in Appendix C for completeness. This regret bound will then be converted in
Theorem 3.9 into an upper bound on I∗X (rT ), thus providing a guarantee for the approachability
game. This conversion is an extension of the scheme introduced in [ABH11].
Lemma 3.8 (Regret bound). Let ∆,K,M > 0. We assume:
(i) maxx∈X h(x) −minx∈X h(x) 6 ∆,
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(ii) h is K-strongly convex with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖,
(iii) ‖rt‖∗ 6M for all t > 1.
Then, the choice ηt =
√
∆K/M2t (for t > 1) guarantees
∀T > 1, max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
〈rt|x〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈rt|xt〉 6 2M
√
∆T
K
.
The following theorem provides upper bounds on I∗X (rT ) (where rT =
1
T
∑T
t=1 rt is the average
payoff) and not only the Euclidean distance from rT to C, which is a special case—see Proposi-
tion 2.6. Therefore, the choice of the generator X determines the quantity that is minimized by the
algorithm. We present in Sections 6, 7 and 8 examples of problems where a judicious choice of gen-
erator X allows I∗X (rT ) to be actually equal to the quantity the Decision Maker aims at minimizing
and therefore yields tailored algorithms.
Theorem 3.9. Let ∆,M,K > 0. We assume:
(i) maxx∈X h(x) −minx∈X h(x) 6 ∆,
(ii) h is K-strongly convex with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖,
(iii) ‖r(a, b)‖∗ 6M for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
Then the above algorithm guarantees, with the choice ηt =
√
∆K/M2t (for t > 1), against any
sequence of actions (bt)t>1 chosen by the Environment,
∀T > 1, I∗X (rT ) 6 2M
√
∆
KT
.
Proof. The regret from Lemma 3.8 is the following quantity:
RegT = max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
〈rt|x〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈rt|xt〉 .
The first term above can be written
max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
〈rt|x〉 = T ·max
x∈X
〈
1
T
T∑
t=1
rt
∣∣∣∣∣x
〉
= T · I∗X (rT ) ,
whereas the second sum is nonpositive because each term is. Indeed, by definition of the algorithm,
and because a is a (A,B, r, C)-oracle.
〈rt|xt〉 = 〈r(at, bt)|xt〉 = 〈r(a(xt), bt)|xt〉 6 0.
Therefore I∗X (rT ) 6
1
T RegT and the regret bound from Lemma 3.8 gives the result. 
The conversion scheme from [ABH11] gives approachability algorithms which minimize the Eu-
clidean distance of the average payoff to the target set. The above approach is an extension, which
allows, by the choice of the generator X , to minimize a whole class of distance-like quantities.
This conversion was here applied to FTRL algorithms, but could have been applied to any online
linear optimization algorithm.
4. Blackwell’s algorithm
We recall the definition of Blackwell’s algorithm [Bla56] and show that it belongs to the family
of FTRL algorithms defined in Section 3.2. In the related work [Shi16], it is demonstrated that
Blackwell’s algorithm can also be interpreted as a Follow the Leader algorithm, as well as a FTRL
algorithm, in the context of online convex optimization algorithms converted into algorithms for the
approachability bounded convex target sets.
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We consider V = V∗ = Rd equipped with its Euclidean structure. Let C ⊂ Rd be a closed convex
cone which we assume to be a B-set for the game (A,B, r) and a : C◦ → X a (A,B, r, C)-oracle. It
follows from Definition 2.7 that it is always possible to choose an oracle a that satisfies
(2) x = λx′ for some λ > 0 =⇒ a(x) = x(x′), x, x′ ∈ C◦.
We assume in this section that oracle a satisfies this property.
Blackwell’s algorithm is defined by
at = a
(
rt−1 − proj
C
rt−1
)
, t > 1,
where projC is the Euclidean projection onto C. It can be rewritten, using Proposition A.2, as
at = a
(
proj
C◦
rt−1
)
, t > 1.
Theorem 4.1. Let X = C◦ ∩ B where B denotes the closed Euclidean ball, and h2 the Euclidean
regularizer on X . Blackwell’s algorithm and the FTRL algorithm associated with h2 and any sequence
of positive and nonincreasing parameters (ηt)t>1 coincide. In other words,
a
(
rt−1 − proj
C
rt−1
)
= a
(
∇h∗2
(
ηt−1
t−1∑
s=1
rs
))
, t > 1.
Proof. Recall that the Euclidean projection projE w of a point w on a closed convex set E is the
only point in E satisfying
(3) ∀w′ ∈ E ,
〈
w − proj
E
w
∣∣∣∣w′ − proj
E
w
〉
6 0.
This characterization will be needed later.
Remember from Proposition 3.7 that ∇h∗2 = projC◦∩B. Since oracle a satisfies property (2), it is
enough to prove that for all u ∈ Rd and µ > 0,
proj
C◦
u ∈ R∗+ proj
C◦∩B
(µu).
Besides, C◦ being a closed convex cone, projC◦(µu) = µ projC◦ u. It is therefore equivalent to prove
that for all w ∈ Rd,
(4) proj
C◦
w ∈ R∗+ proj
C◦∩B
w.
Let w ∈ Rd. If ‖projC◦ w‖2 6 1, then obviously projC◦ w = projC◦∩B w as shown in Figure 3 and (4)
is true. We now assume that ‖projC◦ w‖2 > 1. We define
w0 :=
projC◦ w
‖projC◦ w‖2
.
Using characterization (3), we aim at proving that w0 = projC◦∩B w (see Figure 4), which would
prove (4). First, w0 belongs to C◦∩B by definition. Let w′ ∈ C◦∩B. For short, denote w1 = projC◦ w.〈
w −w0
∣∣w′ − w0〉 = 〈w −w1 + w1 − w0∣∣w′ −w0〉
=
〈
w −w1
∣∣w′ − w0〉+ 〈w1 − w0∣∣w′ − w0〉
=
1
‖w1‖
〈
w − w1
∣∣‖w1‖w′ −w1〉+ 〈w1 − w0∣∣w′ − w0〉 .
The first dot product above is nonpositive by characterization of w1 = projC◦ w, because ‖w1‖w′ ∈
C◦. Let us prove that the second dot product is also nonpositive. For all w′′ ∈ C◦ ∩ B, we have∥∥w1 − w′′∥∥ > ∣∣‖w1‖ − ∥∥w′′∥∥∣∣ > ‖w1‖ − 1 = ‖w1 − w0‖ ,
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• projC◦ w = projC◦∩B w
•
w
C◦ ∩ B
C◦
C
• 0
Figure 3. In the case where ‖projC◦ w‖2 6 1, we have projC◦ w = projC◦∩B w.
• w1 = projC◦ w
•w•
w0 = projC◦∩B w
C◦ ∩ B
C◦
C
• 0
Figure 4. In the case where ‖projC◦ w‖2 > 1, we have w0 = projC◦∩B w.
which means that w0 = projC◦∩B w1. Thus, 〈w1 − w0|w′ − w0〉 6 0. Therefore, 〈w −w0|w′ − w0〉 6
0 and (4) is proved. 
We can now recover via Theorem 3.9 the classic guarantee for Blackwell’s algorithm in the case
where the vector payoffs are bounded with respect to the Euclidean norm.
Theorem 4.2. Let M > 0. Assume that ‖r(a, b)‖2 6 M for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Then, against
any sequence of actions (bt)t>1 chosen by the Environment, Blackwell’s algorithm guarantees:
∀T > 1, d2 (rT , C) 6
√
2M√
T
,
where d2 denotes the Euclidean distance.
Proof. With notation from Theorem 4.1, we have maxx∈X h2(x) −minx∈X h2(x) = 1/2, and h2 is
1-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖2 by Proposition 3.7. According to Theorem 4.1, Blackwell’s
algorithm corresponds to the FTRL algorithm associated with h2 and any sequence of parameters
(ηt)t>1. We can therefore apply Theorem 3.9 together with Proposition 2.6 and the result follows.

10
5. Model with mixed actions
We here consider a variant of the model from Section 2.1, in which the decision maker has a
finite set of actions I = {1, . . . , d} from which he is allowed to choose at random. We define the
corresponding FTRL algorithms, and state guarantees in expectation, with high probability, and
almost-surely. Let the simplex ∆d ⊂ Rd be the set of mixed actions (by identifying it to the set
of probability distributions over I), B a set of actions for the Environment, and r:I × B → Rd a
payoff function. We linearly extend the payoff function r in its first variable:
r(a, b) := Ei∼a [r(a, b)] =
d∑
i=1
air(i, b), a ∈ ∆d, b ∈ B.
The game is played as follows. At time t > 1,
• the Decision Maker chooses mixed action at ∈ ∆d;
• the Environment chooses action bt ∈ B;
• the Decision Maker draws pure action it ∼ at;
• the Decision Maker observes vector payoff rt = r(it, bt).
Denote (Ft)t>1 the filtration where Ft is generated by
(a1, b1, i1, . . . , at−1, bt−1, it−1, at, bt).
An algorithm for the Decision Maker is a sequence of maps σ = (σt)t>1 where σt : (∆d×I×V∗)t−1 →
∆d so that action at is given by
at = σt(a1, i1, r1, . . . , at−1, it−1, rt−1), t > 1.
Regarding the Environment, we assume that its choice of action bt does not depend on it, so that
E [r(it, bt) | Ft] = Ei∼at [r(i, bt)] = r(at, bt). In this model, Blackwell’s condition writes as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Blackwell’s condition for games with mixed actions). A closed convex cone C of
the payoff space V∗ is a B-set for the game with mixed actions (I,B, r) if
∀x ∈ C◦, ∃ a(x) ∈ ∆d, ∀b ∈ B, 〈r(a(x), b)|x〉 6 0.
Such an application a : C◦ → ∆d is called a (I,B, r, C)-oracle.
We can now define the FTRL algorithms similarly as in Section 3.2. Let C be a closed convex
cone of the payoff space V∗ which is assumed to be a B-set for the game with mixed actions (I,B, r),
a : C◦ → ∆d a (I,B, r, C)-oracle, X a generator of C◦, h a regularizer on X , and (ηt)t>1 a positive
and nonincreasing sequence. Then, the corresponding algorithm writes, for t > 1,
compute xt = ∇h∗
(
ηt−1
t−1∑
s=1
rs
)
compute at = a(xt)
draw it ∼ at
observe rt = r(it, bt).
Theorem 5.2. Let ∆,M,K > 0. We assume:
(i) maxx∈X h(x) −minx∈X h(x) 6 ∆,
(ii) h is K-strongly convex with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖,
(iii) ‖r(a, b)‖∗ 6M for all a ∈ ∆d and b ∈ B.
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Then the above algorithm guarantees, with the choice ηt =
√
∆K/M2t (for t > 1), against any
sequence of actions (bt)t>1 chosen by the Environment:
∀T > 1, E [I∗X (rT )] 6 2M
√
∆
KT
.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1). For all T > 1, we have with probability higher than 1− δ,
I∗X (rT ) 6
M√
T
(
2
√
∆
K
+ ‖X‖
√
2 log(1/δ)
)
.
Almost-surely,
lim sup
T→+∞
I∗X (rT ) 6 0.
Proof. Like in the proof of Theorem 3.9, Lemma 3.8 gives:
(5) I∗X (rT ) 6
1
T
(
T∑
t=1
〈rt|xt〉+ 2M
√
∆T
K
)
.
Consider Xt = 〈rt|xt〉. Then, (Xt)t>1 is a sequence of super-martingale differences with respect to
filtration (Ft)t>0:
E [〈rt|xt〉 | Ft] = E [〈r(it, bt)|xt〉 | Ft] = 〈E [r(it, bt) | Ft]|xt〉 = 〈r(at, bt)|xt〉 6 0,
because x is a (I,B, r, C)-oracle. Therefore,
E
[
T∑
t=1
〈rt|xt〉
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
E [〈rt|xt〉 | Ft]
]
6 0.
Injecting this in Equation (5) gives the guarantee in expectation:
E [I∗X (rT )] 6 2M
√
∆
KT
.
We now turn to the high probability bound. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). From Equation (5), we deduce that
I∗X (rT ) 6 2M
√
∆
KT
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt.
Since we have |Xt| = |〈r(it, bt)|xt〉| 6 ‖r(it, bt)‖∗ ‖xt‖ 6M ‖X‖ for all t > 1, the Azuma–Hoeffding
inequality assures that with probability higher than 1− δ,
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt 6M ‖X‖
√
2 log(1/δ)
T
and thus
I∗X (rT ) 6
M√
T
(
2
√
∆
K
+ ‖X‖
√
2 log(1/δ)
)
.
The almost-sure guarantee follows from a standard Borel–Cantelli argument. 
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6. Regret minimization with global costs
The problem of regret minimization with global costs was introduced in [EDKMM09]. It is an
adversarial online learning problem motivated by load balancing and job scheduling, where at each
step, the Decision Maker first chooses a distribution (task allocation) over d machines, and then
observes the cost of using each machine, which may be different for each machine and each step.
The goal of the Decision Maker is to minimize, not the sum of the cumulative costs of using each
machine, but a given function of the vector of cumulative costs. A typical example of such global
cost function is the ℓp norm, which includes as special cases the sum of the costs (for p = 1),
as well as the makespan i.e. the highest cumulative cost (for p = ∞). A very common approach
for this type of problem is to focus on competitive ratio [BEY98, AKP+93, Mol17]. We instead
follow [EDKMM09] and aim at minimizing the regret.
In the seminal paper [EDKMM09], the authors introduce a reduction of the problem to an
approachability game and obtain a regret bound of order O((log d)/
√
T ) for the ℓ∞ cost function.
For general convex cost functions, the authors present a regret bound that reads
√
dT ; however,
this expression does not reflect the true dependency of the bound in the number d of machines, as
this bound also involves the Lipschitz constant of the cost function which may also depend on d, as
it is the case for ℓp cost functions. In a theoretical work, [RST11] proved that the optimal bound
is of order O(
√
(log d)/T ) in the ℓ∞ case, but no algorithm achieving this bound was provided.
[BS15] also studied alternative algorithms for minimizing regret with global cost but no explicit
bound was given. In a recent paper [LHT20], new algorithms are proposed, based on a technique
for adapting online convex optimization algorithms to approachability games [Shi16], and regret
bounds for monotone norms cost functions (which include ℓp norms) are derived. The bounds are
abstract, except for the ℓ∞ case where the algorithm achieve the optimal bound O(
√
(log d)/T ) in
addition of being the first such algorithm to run in polynomial time. Besides, more general problems
than the one we consider below are studied in [AFFT14, MPS14] and both provide algorithms with
convergence rate T−1/4.
In this section, we use the approach presented in Sections 2 and 3 to construct an algorithm
for general norm cost functions, thus dropping the monotone norm assumption from [LHT20],
and derive a general regret bound in Theorem 6.4. In the special case of ℓp norm cost functions,
we obtain explicit regret bounds in Corollary 6.5, which smoothly interpolates from the optimal
O(
√
(log d)/T ) in the case p = ∞ to O(d/√T ) in the case p = 1. To the best of our knowledge,
these are the first regret bounds for ℓp norm cost functions for 1 6 p <∞ with explicit dependence
in d and p.
We use the reduction of the problem to an approachability game from [EDKMM09]. We then
choose a generator of the polar of the target set based on a specially crafted norm on the payoff
space, which then enables us to bound the regret with cost functions by a support function. Then,
in the case of ℓp cost functions, the explicit regret bounds are derived using a ℓq′ regularizer with a
carefully chosen q′ parameter.
6.1. Problem statement. Let d > 2 be an integer and ‖ · ‖ a norm on Rd. For t > 1,
• the Decision Maker chooses a distribution at ∈ ∆d,
• the Environment chooses a loss vector ℓt ∈ [0, 1]d.
The Decision Maker aims at minimizing the following average regret:
RegT =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
at ⊙ ℓt
∥∥∥∥∥− mina∈∆d
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
a⊙ ℓt
∥∥∥∥∥ ,
where ⊙ denotes the component-wise multiplication. At each stage t > 1, the i-th component of
vector at ◦ ℓ is equal to atiℓi and corresponds to the cost of using machine i for a fraction ati of the
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job. The regret is the difference between the actual global cost incurred by the Decision Maker and
the best possible global cost in hindsight for a static distribution a ∈ ∆d. Important special cases
include the makespan which corresponds to p =∞: the global cost is then the highest average cost
over the machines; and for p = 1 the global cost simply corresponds to the sum of the costs of all
the machines.
6.2. Reduction to an approachability game. We recall the reduction given in [EDKMM09,
Section 4] of the above problem to an approachability game which fits the model from Section 2.
Consider the following action sets for the Decision Maker and the Environment respectively:
A = ∆d and B = [0, 1]d. Define the payoff function r : ∆d × [0, 1]d → (Rd) as follows:
r(a, ℓ) = (a⊙ ℓ, ℓ), a ∈ ∆d, ℓ ∈ [0, 1]d,
and consider the following target set:
C =
{
(y, y′) ∈ (Rd+)2 | ‖y‖ 6 min
a∈∆d
∥∥a⊙ y′∥∥} .
The payoff space is therefore V∗ = (Rd)2.
Proposition 6.1 ([EDKMM09]). C is a closed convex cone. Moreover, it is a B-set for the game
(∆d, [0, 1]
d, r) .
Proof. We give the proof for the sake of completeness and essentially follow [EDKMM09, Lemma 5
& Theorem 6]. C can be written as C = {(y, y′) ∈ (Rd+)2 | ‖y‖ −mina∈∆d ‖a⊙ y′‖ 6 0}, which then
appears as a closed level set of a convex function because y 7→ ‖y‖ is continuous and convex as all
norms, and because y′ 7→ mina∈∆d ‖a⊙ y′‖ is concave on Rd+ according to [RST11, Lemma 22] and
continuous as the minimum of a family of continuous functions. C is thus closed and convex, and
because it is is clearly closed by multiplication by a nonnegative scalar, it is a closed convex cone.
We now establish that C is a B-set for the game (∆d, [0, 1]d, r) using Blackwell’s dual condition
from Proposition 2.8. Let ℓ ∈ [0, 1]d and consider a = argminx∈∆d ‖a⊙ ℓ‖. Then, we clearly have
r(a, ℓ) ∈ C, which concludes the proof. 
Remark 6.2 (Computation of the oracle). As noted in [EDKMM09, Section 4] and [LHT20, Sec-
tion 4.1], a (∆d, [0, 1]
d, r, C)-oracle is given by
a(z, z′) = argmin
a∈∆d
d∑
i=1
max(0, xiai − x′i), (x, x′) ∈ C◦,
which is a linear program with O(d) variables and O(d) constraints, which can thus be computed
in polynomial time.
6.3. A special norm on the payoff space. We now define a special norm on the payoff space
V∗ which will allow us to bound the regret from above with the help of a support function, and will
therefore provide the generator of C◦ for defining the regularizer and constructing our algorithm.
We introduce the following norm ‖ · ‖V∗ whose definition is based on the norm ‖ · ‖ given in
Section 6.1: ∥∥(y, y′)∥∥
V∗
= ‖y‖+ max
a∈∆d
∥∥a⊙ y′∥∥ , (y, y′) ∈ V∗ = (Rd)2.
We also consider the associated the dual norm, defined on V, which we denote ‖ · ‖V . We can now
consider the following generator of C◦: X = B∩C◦, where B denotes the closed unit ball with respect
to ‖ · ‖V . The following proposition shows that this choice of X makes the regret RegT bounded
from above by I∗X (rT ).
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Proposition 6.3. Let (at)t>1 and (ℓt)t>1 be sequences of actions chosen by the Decision Maker and
the Environment respectively. Denote for all t > 1, rt = r(at, ℓt) the corresponding payoffs. Then
for all T > 1, the regret is bounded as:
RegT =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
at ⊙ ℓt
∥∥∥∥∥− mina∈∆d
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
a⊙ ℓt
∥∥∥∥∥ 6 I∗B∩C◦ (rT ) ,
where B denotes the closed unit ball associated with ‖ · ‖V .
Proof. Let T > 1 and denote y = 1T
∑T
t=1 at ⊙ ℓt and y′ = 1T
∑T
t=1 ℓt. Let (y˜, y˜
′) ∈ C be any vector
from the target set. Then, we can write:
RegT = ‖y‖ − min
a∈∆d
∥∥a ◦ y′∥∥ = ‖y‖ − ‖y˜‖+ ‖y˜‖ − min
a∈∆d
∥∥a⊙ y′∥∥+ min
a∈∆d
∥∥a⊙ y˜′∥∥− min
a∈∆d
∥∥a⊙ y˜′∥∥
6
∥∥y − y′∥∥+ min
a∈∆d
∥∥a⊙ y˜′∥∥− min
a∈∆d
∥∥a⊙ y′∥∥ = ∥∥y′ − y∥∥+ max
a∈∆d
min
a′∈∆d
{∥∥a⊙ y˜′∥∥− ∥∥a⊙ y′∥∥}
6
∥∥y − y′∥∥+ max
a∈∆d
∥∥a⊙ (y˜′ − y′)∥∥ = ∥∥(y, y′)− (y˜, y˜′)∥∥
V∗
,
where the first inequality follows from the reverse triangle inequality and the definition of C and the
third inequality from removing the minimum over a′ ∈ ∆d and using the reverse triangle inequality
again. Then, taking the minimum over (y˜, y˜′) ∈ C and applying Proposition 2.6 gives the result:
RegT 6 min
(y˜,y˜′)∈C
∥∥(y, y′)− (y˜, y˜′)∥∥
V∗
= I∗B∩C◦(y, y
′) = I∗B∩C◦
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
r(at, ℓt)
)
.

6.4. Definition and analysis of the algorithm. Let q′ ∈ (1, 2]. We consider on X = B ∩ C◦ the
ℓq′ regularizer introduced in Section 3.1:
hq′(x) =
{
1
2 ‖x‖2q′ if x ∈ X
+∞ otherwise, , x ∈ V.
Let (ηt)t>1 a positive and nonincreasing sequence, and a the oracle from Remark 6.2. The algorithm
then writes, for t > 1,
compute xt = ∇h∗q′
(
ηt−1
t−1∑
s=1
rs
)
compute at = argmin
a∈∆d
d∑
i=1
max(0, ztiai − z′ti), where (zt, z′t) = xt,
observe rt = r(at, bt).
Theorem 6.4 (Regret bound for an arbitrary norm cost function). Let q′ ∈ (1, 2] and ∆ > 0 such
that maxx∈X
1
2 ‖x‖2q′ 6 ∆. Then, the above algorithm with coefficients
ηt = d
1/q′−1
√
∆(q′ − 1)
t
, t > 1,
guarantees, against any sequence (ℓt)t>1 in [0, 1]
d chosen by the Environment,
∀T > 1, RegT 6 2 d1−1/q
′
√
∆
(q′ − 1)T .
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Proof. We aim at applying Theorem 3.9. According to Proposition 3.7, because q′ ∈ (1, 2], regular-
izer hq′ is (q
′ − 1)/d2(1−1/q′) strongly-convex with respect to ‖ · ‖1. Besides, the payoff function r is
bounded by 1 with respect to ‖ · ‖∞. Indeed, for all a ∈ ∆d and ℓ ∈ [0, 1]d,
‖r(a, ℓ)‖∞ = ‖(a⊙ ℓ, ℓ)‖∞ = max (‖a⊙ ℓ‖∞ , ‖ℓ‖∞) 6 1.
And because 0 ∈ X , we have the difference between the highest and the lowest values of hq′ on its
domain bounded from above as:
max
x∈X
hq′(x)−min
x∈X
hq′(x) = max
x∈X
1
2
‖x‖2q′ −minx∈X
1
2
‖x‖2q′ = maxx∈X ‖x‖
2
q′ 6 ∆.
Therefore, applying Theorem 3.9 with ∆ = ∆, K = (q′ − 1)/d2(1−1/q′), M = 1 and norm ‖ · ‖1,
together with Proposition 6.3, gives the result. 
Corollary 6.5 (Regret bounds for ℓp global cost functions). Let p ∈ [1,+∞] and q′ ∈ (1, 2]. Assume
‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖p. Then, the above algorithm coefficients
ηt = d
max(2/q′−1/p−2,1/q′−1)
√
2(q′ − 1)
t
, t > 1,
guarantees, against any sequence (ℓt)t>1 in [0, 1]
d chosen by the Environment,
(6) ∀T > 1, RegT 6 I∗B∩C◦ (rT ) 6 2
√
2
dmax(1/p,1−1/q
′)√
(q′ − 1)T .
Consequently,
• if p = +∞, the choice q′ = 1 + (2 log d− 1)−1 yields
RegT 6 4
√
e log d
T
,
• if 2 6 p < +∞, the choice q′ = 1 + (2 log d− 1)−1 yields
RegT 6 4d
1/p
√
log d
T
,
• if 1 6 p 6 2, the choice q′ = 2 yields
RegT 6 2
√
2
d1/p√
T
.
Proof. Let us derive an upper bound on maxx∈X hq′(x) in this special case and apply Theorem 6.4.
Let q > 1 be the conjugate quantity of p, i.e. q = (1 − 1/p)−1. Denote ‖ · ‖p˜ = maxa∈∆d ‖a⊙ ·‖p
and ‖ · ‖p˜∗ its dual norm. First, we can see that ‖ · ‖p˜ 6 ‖ · ‖p. It is indeed immediate for p = +∞,
and for 1 6 p < +∞ we can write for all y ∈ Rd:
‖y‖p˜ = max
a∈∆d
‖a⊙ y‖p = max
a∈∆d
(
d∑
i=1
ai |yi|p
)1/p
6 max
a∈∆d
(
d∑
i=1
|yi|p
)1/p
= ‖y‖p .
We deduce that ‖ · ‖q 6 ‖ · ‖p˜∗. Indeed, for z ∈ Rd,
‖z‖q = max
y∈Rd
‖y‖p61
〈y|z〉 6 max
y∈Rd
‖y‖p˜61
〈y|z〉 = ‖y‖p˜∗ .
16
Besides, for all (z, z′) ∈ V, ‖(z, z′)‖V = max
(
‖z‖q , ‖z′‖p˜∗
)
. Indeed:∥∥(z, z′)∥∥
V
= max
(y,y′)∈(Rd)2
‖y‖p+‖y
′‖p˜=1
{〈y|z〉+ 〈y′∣∣z′〉} = max
λ∈[0,1]
max
(y,y′)∈(Rd)2
‖y‖p=λ, ‖y‖p˜=1−λ
{〈y|z〉+ 〈y′∣∣z′〉}
= max
λ∈[0,1]
max
(y,y′)∈(Rd)2
‖y‖p=‖y
′‖p˜=1
{〈λy|z〉+ 〈(1− λ)y′∣∣z′〉}
= max
λ∈[0,1]
{
λ max
‖y‖p=1
〈y|z〉+ (1− λ) max
‖y′‖p˜=1
〈
y′
∣∣z′〉
}
= max
λ∈[0,1]
{
λ ‖z‖q + (1− λ)
∥∥z′∥∥
p˜∗
}
= max
(
‖z‖q ,
∥∥z′∥∥
p˜∗
)
.
We can now write:
max
x∈X
1
2
‖x‖2q′ 6 max
x∈B
1
2
‖x‖2q′ = max
‖(z,z′)‖2
V
61
1
2
∥∥(z, z′)∥∥2
q′
= max
‖z‖q61
‖z′‖p˜∗61
1
2
∥∥(z, z′)∥∥2
q′
6 max
‖z‖q61
‖z′‖q61
1
2
∥∥(z, z′)∥∥2
q′
= max
‖z‖q61
‖z′‖q61
1
2
(
‖z‖q′q′ +
∥∥z′∥∥q′
q′
)2/q′
.
Then, standard inequalities between ℓp norms give ‖ · ‖q′ 6 dmax(1/q
′−1/q,0) ‖ · ‖q. Therefore,
max
‖z‖q61
‖z′‖q61
1
2
(
‖z‖q′q′ +
∥∥z′∥∥q′
q′
)
6 max
‖z‖q61
‖z′‖q61
1
2
dmax(1/q
′−1/q,0)
(
‖z‖q′q +
∥∥z′∥∥q′
q
)2/q′
6 22/q
′−1dmax(2/q
′−2/q,0)
6 2dmax(2/q
′−2/q,0).
Finally, applying Theorem 6.4 with ∆ = 2dmax(2/q
′−2/q,0) gives the result. 
Remark 6.6. It is possible to show, through a tedious analysis, that the parameter q′ ∈ (1, 2] which
minimizes the upper bound from (6) is given by
q′ =


2 if p 6 2 or d 6 7
max
(
log d
(
1−
√
1− 2log d
)
,
(
1− 1p
)−1)
otherwise,
which yields the same guarantees as in Corollary 6.5, up to multiplicative constants.
7. Online combinatorial optimization
We consider the online combinatorial optimization problem with full information feedback. It
is a regret minimization problem in which the actions and the payoffs have a particular struc-
ture. Numerous papers were written on the topic, including [GW98, KW01, GLS01, TW03, KV05,
WK08, HW09, HKW10]. A minimax optimal algorithm was given in [KWK10]. We give below an
alternative construction of such an algorithm.
Let d,m > 1 be integers. Let I = {1, . . . , d} be a finite set. The set of pure actions of the
Decision Maker is a set P which contains subsets of I of cardinality m. ∆(P ) is the set of mixed
actions over P . The game is played as follows. At time t > 1, the Decision Maker
• chooses mixed action at ∈ ∆(P );
• draws pure action pt ∼ at;
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• observes payoff vector vt ∈ Rd;
• gets payoff ∑i∈pt vti.
As usual, we assume that the choice by the Environment of payoff vector vt ∈ Rd does not depend
on pure action pt. The quantity to minimize is the following regret:
RegT = max
p∈P
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈p
vti −
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈pt
vti.
This problem can be seen as a basic regret minimization problem with pure action set P , and
payoff vectors (
∑
i∈p vi)p∈P which belong to [−m,m]P as soon as we assume v ∈ [−1, 1]d. The
classical Exponential Weights Algorithm [CB97] would then guarantee a regret bound of order
m
√
T log |P |. However, our goal is to take advantage of the structure of the problem and to construct
a algorithm which guarantees a significantly tighter regret bound, of order m
√
T log(d/m), which
is known to be minimax optimal [KWK10]. To do so, we reduce this problem to a well-chosen
approachability game (with mixed actions, as in Section 5), which we now present.
Let A be the d×|P | matrix defined by A = (1{i∈p}) i∈I
p∈P
, and for each p ∈ P , let ep = (1{i∈p})i∈I ∈
R
d. Let P (resp. ∆(P )) be the set of pure (resp. mixed) actions for the Decision Maker, B = [−1, 1]d
the set of actions for the Environment, and the following payoff function:
r(p, v) = v − 〈v|ep〉
m
1 ∈ Rd, p ∈ P, v ∈ [−1, 1]d,
where 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rd. The payoff space is therefore V∗ = Rd. The linear extension of the
payoff function in its first variable writes:
r(a, v) = v − 〈v|Aa〉
m
1, a ∈ ∆(P ), v ∈ [−1, 1]d.
We now choose the generator: let X = A(∆(P )) be the image of the simplex ∆(P ) via A seen as a
linear map from RP to Rd. Its properties are gathered in the following proposition. In particular,
property (v) demonstrates that this choice of X makes I∗X (rT ) equal to the above defined regret.
Proposition 7.1. (i) X is the convex hull of the points ep (p ∈ P ).
(ii) X ⊂ m∆d.
(iii) ‖X‖1 = m.
(iv) X is a generator of X ◦◦ = A(∆(P ))◦◦.
(v) Let (pt)t>1 be a sequence of pure actions chosen by the Decision Maker and (vt)t>1 a sequence
of actions chosen by the Environment, and denote rt = r(pt, vt) for all t > 1 the corresponding
payoffs. Then,
I∗X (rT ) =
1
T
RegT =
1
T

max
p∈P
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈p
vti −
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈pt
vti

 .
Proof. By definition, X is the image of simplex ∆(P ) via linear map A. It is therefore the convex
hull of the image by A of the extreme points of ∆(P ). And for p0 ∈ P , A(1{p=p0})p∈P = ep. Hence
(i). Each point ep clearly belongs to m∆d, and (ii) is true by convexity of m∆d. For each element
x ∈ m∆d, we have ‖x‖1 = m, which implies (iii). X is a nonempty convex compact set thanks to
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(i); Proposition 2.4 gives (iv). As for the relation (v), we denote A∗ the transpose of A and write
max
p∈P
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈p
vti −
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈pt
vti = max
p∈P
T∑
t=1
((A∗vt)p − (A∗vt)pt)
= max
a∈∆(P )
T∑
t=1
(
〈A∗vt|a〉 −
〈
A∗vt
∣∣∣(1{p=pt})p∈P
〉)
= max
a∈∆(P )
T∑
t=1
(
〈vt|Aa〉 −
〈
vt
∣∣∣A (1{p=pt})p∈P
〉)
= max
x∈A(∆(P ))
T∑
t=1
(〈vt|x〉 − 〈vt|ept〉)
= max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
〈
vt − 〈vt|ept〉
m
1
∣∣∣∣x
〉
= max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
〈r(pt, vt)|x〉
= T · I∗X (rT ),
where in the fifth line, we used the fact that for all x ∈ X , 〈1|x〉 = m, which is a consequence of
(ii). 
Proposition 7.2. A(∆(P ))◦ is a B-set for the game with mixed actions (P, [−1, 1]d, r).
Proof. Since X is a generator of A(∆(P ))◦◦, one can check that the condition that defines a B-set
only needs to be verified for x ∈ X . Let x ∈ X . By definition of X , there exists a ∈ ∆(P ) such that
x = Aa. Then for v ∈ [−1, 1]d,
〈r(a, v)|x〉 =
〈
v − 〈v|Aa〉
m
1
∣∣∣∣Aa
〉
= 〈v|Aa〉 − 〈v|Aa〉 = 0,
which proves the result. 
As a consequence of Proposition 7.1, a point x ∈ X only has nonnegative components. We can
therefore define
h(x) =


d∑
i=1
xi
m
log
xi
m
for x ∈ X
+∞ otherwise.
Proposition 7.3. (i) h is a regularizer on X ;
(ii) maxx∈X h−minx∈X h(x) 6 log(d/m);
(iii) h is 1/m2-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖1.
Proof. For x ∈ X ⊂ m∆d, we can write h(x) = hent(x/m) < +∞. The 1-strong convexity of hent
with respect to ‖ · ‖1 implies the 1/m2-strong convexity of h with respect to ‖ · ‖1 and (iii) is proved.
In particular, h is strictly convex. Besides, the domain of h is X by definition and (i) is proved. As
for (ii), h being convex, its maximum is attained at one of the extreme points ep (p ∈ P ) of X :
max
x∈X
h(x) = max
p∈P
h(ep) = max
p∈P
∑
i∈p
1
m
log
1
m
= − logm.
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As for the minimum,
min
x∈X
h(x) > min
x∈m∆d
d∑
i=1
xi
m
log
xi
m
= min
x∈∆d
d∑
i=1
xi log xi = − log d.
Therefore, maxx∈X h−minx∈X h(x) 6 − logm+ log d = log(d/m). 
We can now consider the FTRL algorithm associated with regularizer h, a (P, [−1, 1]d, r, A(∆(P ))◦)-
oracle a, and a positive nonincreasing sequence of parameters (ηt)t>1, for t > 1,
compute xt = ∇h∗
(
ηt−1
t−1∑
s=1
rs
)
choose at = a(xt)
draw pt ∼ at
observe rt = r(pt, vt) = vt − 〈vt|Aept〉
m
1.
Theorem 7.4. Against any sequence (vt)t>1 in [−1, 1]d chosen by the Environment, the above
algorithm with parameters ηt =
√
log(d/m)/4m2t (for t > 1) guarantees
E [RegT ] 6 4m
√
T log(d/m).
For δ ∈ (0, 1), we have with probability higher than 1− δ,
RegT 6 2m
√
T
(
2
√
log(d/m) +
√
2 log(1/δ)
)
.
Almost-surely,
lim sup
T→+∞
1
T
RegT 6 0.
Proof. For all v ∈ [−1, 1]d and p ∈ P ,
‖r(p, v)‖∞ =
∥∥∥∥v − 〈v|Aep〉m 1
∥∥∥∥
∞
6 ‖v‖∞ +
‖1‖∞
m
∑
i∈p
|vi| 6 2.
The result then follows from Theorem 5.2 applied with M = 2, K = 1/m2, the properties of the
regularizer h given by Proposition 7.3, and the relation (v) from Proposition 7.1. 
8. Internal and swap regret
The notion of internal regret was introduced by [FV97]. It is an alternative quantity to the usual
regret. [FV97] first established the existence of algorithms which guarantees that the average inter-
nal regret is asymptotically nonpositive (see also [FL95, FL99, HMC00, HMC01, SL05]). [BM05]
introduced the swap regret, which generalizes both the internal and the basic regret. The optimal
bound on the swap regret is known since [BM05, SL05]. Later, [Per15] proposed an approachability-
based optimal algorithm. We present below the construction of a similar algorithm using the tools
introduced in the previous sections. The internal regret is mentioned at the end of the section as a
special case.
The set of pure actions of the Decision Maker is I = {1, . . . , d}. At time t > 1, the Decision
Maker
• chooses mixed action at ∈ ∆d;
• draws pure action it ∼ at;
• observes payoff vector vt ∈ Rd.
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Let Φ be a nonempty subset of II . The quantity to minimize is the Φ-regret defined by
RegT = max
ϕ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
vtϕ(it) −
T∑
t=1
vtit ,
and can be interpreted as follows. For a given map ϕ ∈ Φ, ∑Tt=1 vtϕ(it) is the cumulative payoff
that the Decision Maker would have obtained if he had played pure action ϕ(i) each time he has
actually played i (for all i ∈ I). The Φ-regret therefore compares the actual cumulative payoff of
the Decision Maker with the best such quantity (for ϕ ∈ Φ) in hindsight. The goal is to construct
an algorithm which guarantees on the Φ-regret a bound of order
√
T log |Φ|. To do so, we reduce
this problem to a well-chosen approachability game (with mixed actions as in Section 5), which we
now present.
Let I (resp. ∆d) the set of pure (resp. mixed) actions for the Decision Maker and [−1, 1]d the
set of actions for the Environment. Let the payoff space be V∗ = RΦ and the target set be RΦ−. We
choose the following payoff function:
r(i, v) =
(
vϕ(i) − vi
)
ϕ∈Φ
∈ RΦ, i ∈ I, v ∈ [−1, 1]d.
The linear extension of the payoff function in its first variable writes:
r(a, v) =
(∑
i∈I
ai(vϕ(i) − vi)
)
ϕ∈Φ
, a ∈ ∆d, v ∈ Rd.
Proposition 8.1. RΦ− is a B-set for the game with mixed actions (I, [−1, 1]d, r).
Proof. Let x = (xϕ)ϕ∈Φ ∈ (RΦ−)◦ = RΦ+. Let us prove that there exists a ∈ ∆(I) such that for all
v ∈ [−1, 1]d, 〈r(a, v)|x〉 6 0. First, the property is trivially true if x = 0. We assume from now on
that x 6= 0.
Denote
x˜ij =
∑
ϕ∈Φ
ϕ(i)=j
xϕ, i, j ∈ I
and let us first prove that there exists a ∈ ∆(I) such that:
(7)
∑
i∈I
aix˜ij = aj
∑
i∈I
x˜ji, j ∈ I.
Notice that for all i ∈ I we have∑
j∈I
x˜ij =
∑
j∈I
∑
ϕ∈Φ
ϕ(i)=j
xϕ =
∑
ϕ∈Φ
xϕ = ‖x‖1 .
x being nonzero, the above quantity is also nonzero and the d×d matrix (x˜ij/‖x‖1)i,j∈I is stochastic
and therefore has an invariant measure a ∈ ∆(I):∑
i∈I
ai
x˜ij
‖x‖1
= aj, j ∈ I.
Multiplying on both sides by ‖x‖1, we get Equation(7):∑
i∈I
aix˜ij = aj ‖x‖1 = aj
∑
i∈I
∑
ϕ∈Φ
ϕ(j)=i
xϕ = aj
∑
i∈I
x˜ji, j ∈ J .
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Let v ∈ [−1, 1]d and compute 〈r(a, v)|x〉:
〈r(a, v)|x〉 =
∑
ϕ∈Φ
xϕ
(∑
i∈I
ai(vϕ(i) − vi)
)
=
∑
i,j∈I
ai(vj − vi)
∑
ϕ∈Φ
ϕ(i)=j
xϕ
=
∑
i,j∈I
ai(vj − vi)x˜ij =
∑
j∈I
vj
∑
i∈I
aix˜ij −
∑
i,j∈I
aivix˜ij
=
∑
j∈I
vjaj
∑
i∈I
x˜ji −
∑
i,j∈I
aivix˜ij = 0,
where we used Equation (7) for the fifth equality. In particular, 〈r(a, v)|x〉 6 0 and RΦ− is indeed a
B-set for the game with mixed actions (I, [−1, 1]d, r). 
As for the generator, we choose X = ∆(Φ) which is a generator of (RΦ−)◦ thanks to Proposition 2.4.
Then the support function of∆(Φ) evaluated at the average payoff is equal to the (average) Φ-regret:
I∗∆(Φ)(rT ) =
1
T
I∗∆(Φ)
(
T∑
t=1
r(it, vt)
)
=
1
T
max
x∈∆(Φ)
〈
T∑
t=1
(
vtϕ(it) − vtit
)
ϕ∈Φ
∣∣∣∣∣x
〉
=
1
T
max
ϕ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
(
vtϕ(it) − vtit
)
=
1
T
(
max
ϕ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
vtϕ(it) −
T∑
t=1
vtit
)
.
On the simplex ∆(Φ), we choose the entropic regularizer presented in Section 3.1:
hent(x) =


∑
ϕ∈Φ
xϕ log xϕ if x ∈ ∆(Φ)
+∞ otherwise.
Then, the algorithm associated with regularizer hent, a (I, [−1, 1]d, r,RΦ−)-oracle a and a sequence
of positive and nonincreasing parameters (ηt)t>1 is the following. For t > 1,
compute xtϕ =
exp
(
ηt−1
∑t−1
s=1 rsϕ
)
∑
ϕ′∈Φ exp
(
ηt−1
∑t−1
s=1 rsϕ′
) , ϕ ∈ Φ
choose at = a(xt)
draw it ∼ at
observe rt = r(it, vt) =
(
vtϕ(it) − vtit
)
ϕ∈Φ
.
This algorithm is computationally efficient. Indeed, the expression of xt is explicit and straight-
forward. Then, the computation of mixed action at = a(xt) via oracle a consists, as shown in the
proof of Proposition 8.1, in finding an invariant measure of a d× d stochastic matrix, which can be
done efficiently.
Theorem 8.2. Against any sequence (vt)t>1 in [−1, 1]d chosen by the Environment, the above
algorithm with parameters ηt =
√
log |Φ| /4t (for t > 1) guarantees
E [RegT ] 6 4
√
T log |Φ|.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1). With probability higher than 1− δ, we have
1
T
RegT 6
1√
T
(
4
√
log |Φ|+ 2
√
2 log(1/δ)
)
.
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Almost-surely,
lim sup
T→+∞
1
T
RegT 6 0.
Proof. For every payoff vector v ∈ [−1, 1]d and pure action i ∈ I ,
‖r(i, v)‖∞ =
∥∥(vϕ(i) − vi)ϕ∈Φ∥∥∞ 6 2.
The result then follows from Theorem 5.2 applied with M = 2, K = 1 and the properties of
regularizer hent given by Proposition 3.5. 
An important special case is when Φ is the set of all transpositions of I , in other words, the set
of maps ϕ : I → I such that there exists i 6= j in I such that
ϕ(i) = j, ϕ(j) = i, and ϕ(k) = k for all k 6∈ {i, j}.
The Φ-regret is then called the internal regret and can be written
max
i,j∈I
T∑
t=1
1{it=i}(vtj − vti).
Since |Φ| = d(d− 1) in this case, Theorem 8.2 assures that the corresponding algorithm guarantees
a bound on the internal regret of order
√
T log d.
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Appendix A. Properties of closed convex cones
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of the bipolar theorem—see e.g.Theorem
3.3.14 in [BL10].
Proposition A.1. Let A be a subset of W.
(i) A◦◦ is the smallest closed convex cone containing A.
(ii) If A is closed and convex, then A◦◦ = R+A.
(iii) If A is a closed convex cone, then A◦◦ = A.
The following statement is a simpler version of Moreau’s decomposition theorem [Mor62].
Proposition A.2. Assume that W is an Euclidean space. We identify W and its dual space W∗.
Let C be a closed convex cone in W, and y ∈ W. Then, y − projC y = projC◦ y, where proj denotes
the Euclidean projection. In particular, y − projC y belongs to C◦.
y − projC y
•0
•
y
•
projC y
• projC◦ y
C
C◦
Figure 5. Illustration of Proposition A.2
Proposition A.3. Let ϕ : W → W˜ be a linear application between two finite-dimensional vector
spaces W and W˜, ϕ∗ its transpose, C and C˜ closed convex cones in W and W˜ respectively.
(i) ϕ(C) is a closed convex cone.
(ii) ϕ−1(C˜) = ϕ∗(C˜◦)◦. In particular, ϕ−1(C˜) is a closed convex cone.
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Proof. Property (i) is obvious. We prove property (ii) as follows. For y ∈ W,
y ∈ ϕ−1(C˜) ⇐⇒ ϕ(y) ∈ C˜ ⇐⇒ ϕ(y) ∈ C˜◦◦
⇐⇒ ∀x˜ ∈ C˜◦, 〈x˜|ϕ(y)〉 6 0
⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ C˜◦, 〈ϕ∗(x˜)|y〉 6 0
⇐⇒ y ∈ ϕ∗(C˜◦)◦.
Therefore, ϕ−1(C˜) is a closed convex cone because it is a polar cone. 
Appendix B. Properties of regularizers
Lemma B.1. Let ‖ · ‖ a norm on V, K > 0 and h, F : V → R ∪ {+∞} two convex functions such
that for all x ∈ V,
h(x) = F (x) or h(x) = +∞.
Then, if F is K-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖, so is h.
Proof. Note that for all x ∈ V, F (x) 6 h(x). Let us prove that h satisfies the condition from
Definition 3.3. Let x, x′ ∈ V, λ ∈ [0, 1] and denote x′′ = λx + (1 − λ)x′. Let us first assume that
h(x′′) = +∞. By convexity of h, either h(x) or h(x′) is equal to +∞, and the right-hand side of
(1) is equal to +∞. Inequality (1) therefore holds. If h(x′′) is finite,
h(x′′) = F (x′′) 6 λF (x) + (1− λ)F (x′)− Kλ(1− λ)
2
∥∥x′ − x∥∥2
6 λh(x) + (1− λ)h(x′)− Kλ(1− λ)
2
∥∥x′ − x∥∥2 ,
and (1) is proved. 
B.1. Proof of Proposition 3.2. (i) Let w ∈ V∗. The function x 7 −→ 〈w|x〉 − h(x) equals −∞
outside of X , and is upper semicontinuous on X which is compact. It thus has a maximum and
h∗(w) < +∞.
(ii,iii) Moreover, this maximum is attained at a unique point because h is strictly convex. Besides,
for x ∈ V and w ∈ V∗
x ∈ ∂h∗(w) ⇐⇒ w ∈ ∂h(x) ⇐⇒ x ∈ argmax
x′∈X
{〈
w
∣∣x′〉− h(x′)} ,
in other words, ∂h∗(w) = argmaxx′∈X {〈w|x′〉 − h(x′)}. This argmax is a singleton as we noticed.
It means that h∗ is differentiable.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 3.5. (i) is immediate, and (ii) is classic (see e.g. [BV04, Example
2.25]).
(iii) hent being convex, its maximum on ∆d is attained at one of the extreme points. At each
extreme point, the value of hent is zero. Therefore, max∆d hent = 0. As for the minimum, hent being
convex and symmetric with respect to the components xi, its minimum is attained at the centroid
(1/d, . . . , 1/d) of the simplex ∆d, where its value is − log d. Therefore, min∆d hent = − log d and
max∆d hent −min∆d hent = log d.
(iv) Consider F : Rd → R ∪ {+∞} defined by
F (x) =
{∑d
i=1(xi log xi − xi) + 1 if x ∈ Rd+
+∞ otherwise.
Let us prove that F is 1-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖1. By definition, the domain of F is Rd+.
It is differentiable on the interior of the domain (R∗+)
d and ∇F (x) = (log xi)16i6d for x ∈ (R∗+)d.
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Therefore, the norm of ∇F (x) goes to +∞ when x converges to a boundary point of Rd+. [Roc70,
Theorem 26.1] then assures that the subdifferential ∂F (x) is empty as soon as x 6∈ (R∗+)d. Therefore,
the characterization of strong convexity from [SS07, Lemma 14], which we aim at proving, can be
written
(8)
〈∇F (x′)−∇F (x)∣∣x′ − x〉 > ∥∥x′ − x∥∥2
1
, x, x′ ∈ (R∗+)d.
Let x, x′ ∈ (R∗+)d. 〈∇F (x′)−∇F (x)∣∣x′ − x〉 = d∑
i=1
log
(x′)i
xi
((x′)i − xi).
A simple study of function shows that (s− 1) log s− 2(s− 1)2/(s+ 1) > 0 for s > 0. Applied with
s = (x′)i/xi, this gives
d∑
i=1
log
(x′)i
xi
((x′)i − xi) >
∥∥x′ − x∥∥2
1
,
and (8) is proved. F is therefore 1-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖1 and so is hent thanks to
Lemma B.1.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3.7. (i) Since p > 1, ‖ · ‖p is a norm and is therefore convex. hp then
clearly is a regularizer on X . (ii) We consider the function F (x) = 12 ‖x‖2p defined on Rd which is
(p− 1)-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖p (see e.g. [Bub11] or [KSST12, Corollary 10]). Then, so
is hp thanks to Lemma B.1.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 3.8
Denote Yt =
∑t
s=1 rt for t > 1 and η0 = η1. Let x ∈ X . Using Fenchel’s inequality, we write
〈YT |x〉 = 〈ηTYT |x〉
ηT
6
h∗(ηTYT )
ηT
+
h(x)
ηT
6
h∗(0)
η0
+
T∑
t=1
(
h∗(ηtYt)
ηt
− h
∗(ηt−1Yt−1)
ηt−1
)
+
maxx∈X h(x)
ηT
.
(9)
Let us bound h∗(ηtYt)/ηt from above. For all x ∈ X we have
〈ηtYt|x〉 − h(x)
ηt
=
〈ηt−1Yt|x〉 − h(x)
ηt−1
− h(x)
(
1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1
)
.
The maximum over x ∈ X of the above left-hand side gives h∗(ηtYt)/ηt. As for the right-hand side,
let us take the maximum over x ∈ X for each of the two terms separately. This gives
h∗(ηtYt)
ηt
6 max
x∈X
{〈ηt−1Yt|x〉 − h(x)
ηt−1
}
+max
x∈X
{
−h(x)
(
1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1
)}
=
h∗(ηt−1Yt)
ηt−1
+
(
min
x∈X
h(x)
)(
1
ηt−1
− 1
ηt
)
,
where we used the fact that the sequence (ηt)t>0 is nonincreasing. Injecting this inequality in (9),
we get
〈YT |x〉 6 h
∗(0)
η0
+
T∑
t=1
h∗(ηt−1Yt)− h∗(ηt−1Yt−1)
ηt−1
+
(
min
x∈X
h(x)
) T∑
t=1
(
1
ηt−1
− 1
ηt
)
+
maxx∈X h(x)
ηT
.
We now make the quantity
Dh∗(ηt−1Yt, ηt−1Yt−1) := h
∗(ηt−1Yt)− h∗(ηt−1Yt−1)− 〈∇h∗(ηt−1Yt−1)|ηt−1Yt − ηt−1Yt−1〉
27
(called a Bregman divergence) appear in the first above sum by by subtracting
〈ηt−1Yt − ηt−1Yt−1|∇h∗(ηt−1Yt−1)〉
ηt−1
= 〈rt|xt〉 .
Therefore,
〈YT |x〉 6 h
∗(0)
η0
+
T∑
t=1
Dh∗(ηt−1Yt, ηt−1Yt−1)
ηt−1
+
T∑
t=1
〈rt|xt〉−minx∈X h(x)
ηT
+
minx∈X h(x)
η0
+
maxx∈X h(x)
ηT
.
Since h∗(0) = −minx∈X h(x), we get
RegT = max
x∈X
〈YT |x〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈rt|xt〉
6
maxX h−minx∈X h(x)
ηT
+
T∑
t=1
Dh∗(ηt−1Yt, ηt−1Yt−1)
ηt−1
6
∆
ηT
+
T∑
t=1
Dh∗(ηt−1Yt, ηt−1Yt−1)
ηt−1
.
The strong convexity of the regularizer h let us bound the above Bregman divergences as follows
(see e.g. [SS07, Lemma 13]):
Dh∗(ηt−1Yt, ηt−1Yt−1) 6
1
2K
‖ηt−1Yt − ηt−1Yt−1‖2∗ =
η2t−1
2K
‖rt‖2∗ , t > 1.
Then, set η =
√
∆/M2 so that ηt = η t
−1/2 for t > 1. The regret bound then becomes
∆
√
T
η
+
M2
2K
T∑
t=1
ηt−1.
We bound the above sum as follows. Since η0 = η1 = η,
T∑
t=1
ηt−1 = η
(
2 +
T−1∑
t=2
1√
t
)
6 η
(∫ 1
0
1√
s
ds+
∫ T−1
1
1√
s
ds
)
= η
∫ T−1
0
1√
s
ds = 2η
√
T − 1 6 2η
√
T .
Injecting the expression of η and simplifying gives the result:
RegT 6 2M
√
T∆
K
.
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